Wherein I act like I haven't been gone for seven months

Plato understands human interaction according to three categories, making, using, and imitating. He chalks art up to the lowest form of interaction: imitation. He his considered the lowest form, because it requires the least knowledge of its object. The maker at least understands the structure of a thing, and the user even more, as he understands its function and use, but, according to Plato, the imitator merely perceives what a thing appears to be and attempts to act accordingly. “It was this then I wished should be agreed upon, when I said that painting, and in short imitation, being far from the truth, delights in its own work, conversing with that part in us which is far from wisdom, and is its companion and friend, to no sound nor genuine purpose. Entirely so, said he. Imitation then, being depraved in itself, and joining with that which is depraved, generates depraved things. It seems so.” For Plato, Pursuing art was base enough to be considered depraved.
Now that we understand where Plato is coming from, we can interact with his accusations against the arts in two ways: within his framework, and against it. Within the Platonic framework there is a facet of the Form matter distinction that Plato fails to identify the possibility form a Form of Art, or Artistry. Plato regularly sullies art by calling it the imitator of all it sees: parrot to everything and master of nothing. Yet, Art is not so easily attained. True art, accurate art, conforms to reality. At its best, art teaches moral lessons, wisdom, and knowledge. At its best art points us to the Good. To prove this point, let us consider a work that many consider a literary masterpiece: Plato’s Republic.
The Republic is not an artless philosophical tome. It is a dialogue. It has characters, and foreshadowing, and a plot. There are jokes, sarcasm, and conflict resolution. And most importantly, it is fictional. Despite the ancients’ legendary capability for retaining long speeches in their memory, no commentator actually attributes the words of the Republic to Socrates, Plato’s mouthpiece. And yet this piece of art points us to the Good. This fiction, this masterpiece, extols the contemplative life. Within the platonic framework, one could actually argue that art is one of the few things that can point directly at the Good with only a paper-thin intermediary. Art is not the problem. Bad art is the problem. Art that is truly imitation, that merely looks at the lines and color of the shoe, and paints without understanding, within Plato’s framework, this is indeed the mere imitation and a poor pursuit.
But why give up the field? Why let Plato frame the argument, his historical superiority not withstanding? Only in Plato’s dualism is the shoe not a venerable object. Consider my servant shoe. It keeps the nails and blisters out, the dust off, and the warmth in. Some humble shoe was the means of transportation that carried Socrates and his message around Athens. Real, wet, human lips delivered Socrates’ Apology, and a tangible pen recorded the words of the Republic. A systematic deconstruction of the theory of the Forms is beyond the scope of this paper, but looking with wide eyes will show us that the rocks and pebbles are rejoicing. Hating the world is the sine qua non of deriding art. Rejecting the objective goodness of objects naturally results in deriding their contemplation and their reproduction in art. This assumption goes to the heart of Plato’s philosophy and is the motivation for his accusation against art as imitation. The ultimate justification for art is an affirmation of the goodness of things, to side with Homer, Aristotle, and Christ.
The resolution of art and philosophy is not found in ratifying and strengthening their distinction, but rather by uniting them under the banner of the pursuit of Truth. The Republic shows that at its best, art is a type of philosophy, and philosophy at its best, is a type of art.